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Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides that "[e]very
Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United
States" who may veto the bill; a vetoed bill can become law only if two-thirds
of those voting in both chambers of Congress approve the bill, notwithstand-
ing the President's objections.' This provision, together with Clause 3, cod-
ify the so-called bicameralism and presentment requirements for statute-
making under the Constitution. For most of our history, bicameralism and
presentment played little role in constitutional discourse. That changed in
the 1980s. Article I, Section 7 figured prominently in several important con-
stitutional debates in the Supreme Court during the last ten years.
Early in the decade, the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha 2 held that a
single-chamber legislative veto of an adjudicative decision violates Article I,
Section 7. The Court rested its holding in Chadha upon the Framers' "origi-
nal intent" that "the bicameral requirement and the Presentment Clauses
would serve essential constitutional functions" that would be violated by
"lawmaking" through action of only one chamber of Congress or without
presentment to the President.3 Confirmed by subsequent summary disposi-
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1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall,
before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed
to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass
the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a
Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and
Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the
Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President
within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same
shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjourn-
ment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
2. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
3. Id. at 951. This statement followed the Court's historical analysis of Article I, Section 1,
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tions, this reasoning suggested the constitutional invalidity of two-house leg-
islative vetoes and of legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking. So interpreted,
Chadha nullified hundreds of federal legislative vetoes. That, in turn, stimu-
lated litigation over whether legislative vetoes are "severable" from the un-
derlying statutes and, hence, whether their invalidity voided the statutes as
well. The Court in Alaska Airlines v. Brock 4 applied the standard severabil-
ity test in a way that rendered all or virtually all legislative vetoes severable
from their statutes.
5
Chadha aroused great interest in the bicameralism and presentment re-
quirements of Article I, Section 7, yet the Court's treatment of those require-
ments both before and after Chadha is not entirely consistent with the broad
reasoning in that decision. For example, in Bowsher v. Synar,6 the Court
invalidated the Gramm-Rudman Act's7 delegation of budget-cutting author-
ity to the Comptroller General, an official removable by Congress." In light
of the reasoning of Chadha, the delegation would appear to be invalid as a
violation of the required procedures for congressional "lawmaking" under
Article I, Section 7.9 Instead, the Court rested its decision upon the general
constitutional structure of separate powers, holding that Congress's action
was an effort to usurp executive powers (vested in the President under Arti-
cle II) by assigning them to an official "controlled" by Congress. 10
More troubling than the Court's waffle in Bowsher is its apparent sacrifice
of bicameralism and presentment in Dames & Moore v. Regan.' 1 There, the
Court held that presidential orders suspending federal litigation against the
Islamic Republic of Iran had the force of "law"-notwithstanding Con-
gress's failure to authorize such action in the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act (IEEPA),12 which authorizes and regulates presidential
actions during foreign affairs emergencies, and further notwithstanding the
inconsistency of such a presidential power with the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act (FSIA), 13 which comprehensively regulates lawsuits brought in
Clauses 2-3. Id. at 946-50. The historical analysis, in turn, was taken almost entirely from THE
FEDERALIST. Id.
4. 480 U.S. 678 (1987).
5. Id. at 684-87.
6. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
7. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
8. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736.
9. Justices Marshall and Stevens took this approach in their votes to invalidate the statute. Id. at
736, 753-59 (Stevens & Marshall, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
10. Id. at 721-26, 732-34 (opinion of the Court). The opinion of the Court, by Chief Justice
Burger (who authored Chadha), was joined by four other Justices. Justices Marshall and Stevens
concurred in the judgment, based upon the Chadha analysis. Justices White and Blackmun
dissented.
11. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
12. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988).
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1611 (1988).
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United States courts against foreign states and their instrumentalities.
1 4 The
Court relied on Congress's "acquiescence" in prior executive agreements set-
tling claims by United States companies against foreign states. Because Con-
gress did not object to this longstanding practice and passed legislation
consistent with the practice, the Court held that "Congress has implicitly
approved the practice."' 5
This reasoning, similar to that in many of the Court's other constitutional
as well as statutory precedents, seems inconsistent with Article I, Section 7,
at least as interpreted two years later in Chadha: If "law" cannot be made by
the vote of a single chamber of Congress (or even by the vote of both cham-
bers, without presentment), how can it be made by the failure of either cham-
ber to act? Another Article I, Section 7 puzzle is presented by Justice White
in his Chadha dissent: If Article I "law" requires bicameral approval and
presentment, why should agency "lawmaking" not be illegitimate for some of
the same reasons as the legislative veto?
1 6
The Court's apparent response to this concern is that delegation to an
agency is valid under Article I so long as the agency is merely administering
the "law" and not making it up. Theoretically, this idea is enforced by the
nondelegation doctrine, which requires that Congress cannot delegate tasks
to agencies without laying down an "intelligible principle" to which the
agency must conform. 17 This idea might reconcile broad delegations to agen-
cies with Article I, Section 7, and in the early 1980s a few Justices signaled a
willingness to enforce the nondelegation doctrine.' 8 In 1988, however, a
unanimous Court rejected application of the nondelegation doctrine in Mis-
tretta v. United States, with some suggestion that the doctrine is basically
unenforceable. 19 This seems anomalous in light of Chadha's commitment of
the Court to enforcing bicameralism and presentment as prerequisites to con-
stitutional lawmaking.
The ability of agencies to make "law" might also be reconciled with Arti-
14. Id. §§ 1604-1605.
15. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680. The Court also relied on the President's "inherent power"
to enter into executive agreements. Id. at 682. But this argument might not provide much support
for the Court's holding that the executive order suspending the lawsuits should be given the force of
"law."
16. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 984-89 (White, J., dissenting).
17. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (Taft, C.J.); see also
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935).
18. Justice Rehnquist endorsed it in American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S.
490. 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Future Justice
Scalia endorsed it by joining the per curiam opinion of the three-judge court in Synar v. United
States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383-85 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub. nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986).
19. 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989).
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cle I, Section 7 by subjecting agency law to judicial review, ensuring that the
agency-made law would reflect the legislative preferences that yielded the
legislation. Paradoxically, however, the Supreme Court has gone in the op-
posite direction, holding in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 20 that courts must defer to agency interpretations of statutes they
are charged with enforcing, unless the agency interpretation is "manifestly
contrary to the statute."' 2' Assuming a broad and legal delegation of law-
making power to the agency, the Court reasoned that aggressive judicial re-
view of the agency's action would be inconsistent with the democratic values
underlying Article 1.22
Decisions in the late 1980s reveal that the Court is even split on the issue
of whether it should consult a statute's legislative history when deciding
whether an agency interpretation is "manifestly contrary to the statute"
under Chevron.23 Indeed, a few Justices argue from Article I, Section 7 that
there are constitutional problems with the Court's reliance on legislative his-
tory (especially committee reports) as "authoritative" evidence of statutory
meaning in any case.24 Under this line of argument, a court's consideration
of legislative history (e.g., committee reports) violates bicameralism because
the whole Congress does not vote on the legislative history, and violates pre-
sentment because the President is usually not represented in the legislative
history and is not presented with it when he or she signs the bill into law.
In spite of--or because of-all this doctrinal debate in the Court's opin-
ions, the import of Article I, Section 7 for lawmaking in the modem adminis-
trative state is unclear. The Court does not seem to have a well-developed
conceptual framework for Article I, Section 7. The closest the Court has
come to such a framework is Chadha, where the Court hearkened back to the
Framers' reasons for the bicameralism and presentment requirements. 25 But
Chadha's conceptual framework is in tension with the results or the reason-
ing of the Court's practice in other areas: it is strikingly inconsistent with
Dames & Moore; arguably inconsistent with Alaska Airlines, Mistretta, Chev-
ron, and the Court's frequent endorsements of legislative history; and sug-
gests a different analysis than that followed by the Court in Bowsher.
More importantly, Chadha's conceptual framework is an unsatisfactory
analysis and application of the Framers' original expectations for the crea-
tion of law pursuant to Article I, Section 7. It is unsatisfactory in three
different ways. First, although Chadha adverts to the purposes the Framers
20. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
21. Id. at 844.
22. Id. at 865-66.
23. Id. at 844.
24. In particular, Justice Scalia has criticized reliance on committee reports. See infra Part II.E.
25. 462 U.S. at 946-51.
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envisioned for bicameralism and presentment, its understanding of those pur-
poses is impoverished; the opinion seems unaware of how bicameralism and
presentment fit into the overall vision of government, which the Framers saw
as a dynamic balance between popular republican governance and "ener-
getic" stable governance. Second, Chadha assumes a wooden and unnecessa-
rily formalist operation of bicameralism and presentment, as simply hoops
that bills must jump through before they become law. A better way to un-
derstand Article I, Section 7 is to view it as setting up a dynamics (rather
than a statics) of power, ultimately subserving the constitutional balance just
noted. Third, Chadha's reliance on the very specific statements of the Fram-
ers is ahistorical, given the vast changes in United States government in the
modem administrative state. Those changes engulf the narrow constitu-
tional vision offered by Chadha and suggest the superiority of an understand-
ing of the Framers' expectations that is pitched at a more general level.
What we want to do in this piece is to rethink Article I, Section 7 in a way
that is both more attentive to the Framers' expectations and goals and more
comprehensible in the modem administrative state. Drawing upon formal
models developed by positive political theory, Part I analyzes Article I, Sec-
tion 7 as a sequential game, in which lawmaking is conceptualized as a dy-
namic interaction between the preferences of the House and Senate
(bicameralism) and the President (presentment). The advent of the adminis-
trative state, in which much "lawmaking" is accomplished by agencies domi-
nated by the President, has altered the game in an important way. From the
perspective of the Framers' original expectations, interpretation of Article I,
Section 7 must meet this challenge, adapting the dynamic game to preserve
its original value.
Part II applies the Framers' original game, updated to account for agency
lawmaking, as a way of evaluating modem constitutional doctrine. Much of
it is found lacking, especially Mistretta's apparent abandonment of the
nondelegation doctrine, Chadha's invalidation of all legislative vetoes,
Alaska Airlines' unrealistic approach to severability, Dames & Moore's ac-
ceptance of lawmaking by acquiescence, and Chevron's deference to agency
decisionmaking. The conclusion of Part II is that if the Court takes the
Framers' intent seriously, its reasoning in Chadha is flawed and its decisions
in other cases incorrect.
Part III steps back and asks whether the Framers' original goals and val-
ues have meaning for the modem administrative state. In other words,
should our conceptualization of Article I, Section 7 be persuasive to a non-
originalist, that is, a judge or scholar who does not care what the Framers
expected, or who feels that their expectations have been so overtaken by sub-
sequent developments as to be irrelevant today? Rather tentatively, we be-
lieve the model does have some value for nonoriginalists because the balance
1992]
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sought by the Framers remains normatively attractive today. We develop
this insight through reconsideration of the validity of the Supreme Court
decisions analyzed in Part II.
I. A GAME THEORETIC MODEL OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONAL
UNDERSTANDING OF BALANCED LAWMAKING
The plain meaning of Article I, Section 7 is that the Constitution does not
contemplate a unicameral parliamentary model of statute creation in which
statutes reflect the preferences of the median legislator. Instead, the model is
a bicameral presidential one in which statutes simply reflect some accommo-
dation of the preferences of the median legislator in two different chambers
and of the President.
This bicameral presidential model of legislation is not in the Constitution
by accident. It reflects a carefully considered judgment by the Framers about
how lawmaking should be structured.26 The Framers admired the legitimacy
of popular republican decisionmaking, but rejected systems of lawmaking by
simple majority votes, either in the form of direct democracy 27 or of a uni-
cameral parliamentary system, 28 because they feared that temporary alli-
ances would establish short-sighted policies not in the public interest. Their
decision to require both bicameral approval and presentment of legislation
before it becomes law represents the Framers' judgments about the need for
balance between republican liberty, in which popular preferences would gen-
erate laws, and stability, in which laws would reflect deliberation among
many perspectives and would not yield abrupt changes in social policy. 29
The Constitution's requirements for lawmaking can be modeled as a se-
quential game, which we dub the "Article I, Section 7 game." The starting
point for the game is the status quo, which prevails in the absence of legisla-
tion. If the median legislator in both chambers can agree on a similar policy
to replace the status quo, the legislature will want to pass a statute imple-
menting the legislative preference. In a parliamentary system, this would be
the end of the game. In our presidential system, the President may not prefer
the policy preferred by the median legislator to the status quo and, hence,
might veto the legislation. The final move would then be that of Congress, to
26. This discussion is mainly informed by THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), and No.
73 (Alexander Hamilton), especially as interpreted in DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY
OF THE FEDERALIST 133-46, 176-79 (1984).
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80-82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322-23 (James Madison), No. 73, at 441-47 (Alexander Hamil-
ton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 226 (James Madison), No. 70, at 423-24 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 162-76.
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override the veto, if two-thirds of the legislators in each chamber prefer the
median chamber preference to that of the President.
Positive political theory suggests a formal model for this sequential
game. 30 For purposes of constructing the model, we assume that information
is complete, in that the preferences of the players, the structure of the game,
and the rationality of the actors are all common knowledge. We also assume
that the players perfectly anticipate the future course of play, that no one is
able to commit to future courses of action, and that all the actors in the
model prefer that their decisions not be overturned. We employ the follow-
ing notation:
SQ = Existing policy (status quo), the default position if no
legislation is enacted to deal with a social problem
H and S = Preferences of the median legislator in the two chambers
of the bicameral legislature
P = Preferences of the President
h and s = Preferences of the pivotal legislator in the House and
Senate, whose vote is needed for the two-thirds majority
needed to override a presidential veto.
x = Statutory policy resulting from the game
In determining whether a statute will be enacted, and where policy will be set
under our game, the critical factor is the relationship of SQ to P, S, H, h, and
s. Consider the following three cases.
3
Case 1: P < H, S < SQ. We start with a case in which the status quo is
objectionable from the perspectives of both Congress and the President, and
their preferences for changing the status quo run in the same direction, but
the President would like to change the status quo more drastically than
would either chamber in Congress. Figure 1 maps the relevant preferences:
30. The sequential game model used infra is similar to the models used in William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L.
REv. 613 (1991); John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Administrative Agen-
cies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 393 (Lawrence C.
Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 4th ed. 1989); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational
Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove
City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 263 (1990); Brian Marks, A Model of Judicial Influ-
ence on Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Washington University) (copy on file at The Georgetown Law Journal).
31. Please note that these three cases do not exhaust the possible preference alignments, but
other variations would be analyzed similarly to one of our three variations. For example, the Fram-
ers expected the Senate and President to be much more inclined to the status quo than the House
(as in H < S, P < SQ). This alignment is similar to Case 1 below, and statutory policy would be
set at x = S. If the President were particularly protective of the status quo (as in H < S < P <
SQ), the alignment of preferences would be similar to Case 3, with statutory policy being set at x =
P. If the House wanted to change the status quo in ways different than the President and the Senate
(H < SQ < S, P), the alignment of preferences would be similar to Case 2, with no statute being
enacted.
1992]
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x
P H S SQ
FIGURE 1. Statutory policy H _< x . S when P < H, S < SQ.
In such a case there is no problem enacting a statute, 32 since both chambers
and the President prefer a range of policies to the status quo. The ultimate
statutory policy will fall somewhere between the preferences of the two legis-
lative chambers (H and S), and the preferences of the President will be irrele-
vant.33 Note here the tendency of the game to avoid drastic shifts away from
the status quo (SQ). The President's preference for a somewhat more signifi-
cant policy shift will have little if any effect on statutory policy under the
circumstances described in Figure 1, for it is Congress that must take the
initial action. And the President cannot credibly threaten to veto any bill
acceptable to Congress because the President prefers any action moving pol-
icy to the left of the status quo.
Case 2: h < SQ < S. Consider how the game changes when the actors'
preferences for changing the status quo run in different directions. Figure 2
maps one illustration of such preferences:
H SQ S
FIGURE 2. No statute when H < SQ < S.
If SQ is anywhere between H and S, Congress would be unable to agree on
statutory policy because the House would prefer the status quo to any point
to the right of SQ. and the Senate would prefer the status quo to any point to
the left of SQ. The Framers expected that such a legislative stalemate would
not be uncommon, and the requirement of bicameral approval reflects the
constitutional presumption in favor of the status quo. Note that for the game
diagrammed in Figure 2, we have left the President out of the Article I,
Section 7 game. The President's preferences are irrelevant when Congress
cannot agree on a statute changing the status quo.
32. We are of course assuming no transaction costs for statutory enactment and frictionless bar-
gaining among the players. We are also for the present assuming away internal congressional barri-
ers such as committees. We take up the role of committees in Part II.
33. That is, even though the President would like to adopt a major shift in policy from the status
quo, neither chamber in Congress is willing to adopt a major shift. Since bicameralism requires the
consent of both chambers, the two chambers will work out a compromise of their preferences (H <
x < S). Presentment does not require the President's consent to legislation, unless his veto can be
backed up by more than a third of one chamber. In the configuration described by Figure 1, the
President cannot credibly threaten to veto the legislature's preferred policy (x), in large part because
a successful veto would leave policy at the status quo (SQ), which the President hates even more
than Congress does.
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Even when Congress can agree on a change in the status quo (as in SQ <
H, S), it still may be unable to enact a statute, if the President prefers the
status quo to any change Congress would like to make. Figure 2A maps one
example of such a situation:
h P s SQ H S
FIGURE 2A. No statute when h < P < SQ < H, S.
The same outcome (no statute) results from the game in Figure 2A as in
Figure 2, but because of the presentment and not the bicameralism require-
ment. That is, even though H and S will agree on a statutory policy located
somewhere between their preferences, the President will be able to sustain a
veto because h, the voters at or near the veto median of the more pro-Presi-
dent chamber, will prefer SQ to x. If SQ is anywhere between h and S, it is
clear that any statutory proposal would have to move policy to the right of
SQ to satisfy the Senate and that any statute that had this effect would be
vetoed by the President. The supporters of the statute would be unable to
produce sufficient votes in H to override the veto, again because h would
prefer SQ to x. Thus, there would be no legislation and policy would remain
at x = SQ. Again, the Framers anticipated this possibility, approvingly, for
they placed the executive veto in Article I, Section 7 to prevent abrupt shifts
in policy even when both chambers of Congress desired it.
Case 3: SQ < h. The President's ability to block legislation ends, of
course, when two-thirds of the legislators in each chamber disagree with the
President about how the status quo should be changed. Figure 3 illustrates
this situation:
x
P SQ h h(SQ) s H S
FIGURE 3. Policy set at x = h(SQ) when SQ < h.
Although the President does not have enough votes in Congress to sustain a
veto, the threat of a veto significantly affects the location of statutory policy.
The threat of a veto induces the median legislator, H, to introduce legislation
at about point h(SQ). Recall that h represents the pivotal legislator for veto
purposes-namely, the legislator whose vote is needed for the two-thirds ma-
jority needed to override a presidential veto. For that "veto median" legisla-
tor, h(SQ) is the point at which she would be indifferent to the choice
between the status quo, SQ, and the proposed policy, h(SQ). By setting pol-
icy just a little to the left of h(SQ), H will be able to attract the pivotal voter,
h, needed to override a presidential veto. If the status quo is located exactly
1992]
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at the preferences of the pivotal voter of the more pro-President chamber (SQ
= h), policy will be set at x = SQ, and no statute will be passed. The
further the status quo is to the left of the veto median, the further to the right
Congress will set statutory policy and not risk a veto. Again, the Framers
anticipated many Case 3 situations, where the President would oppose Con-
gress's desire to change the status quo. The majority required in each cham-
ber of Congress to override a presidential veto would ensure a more
moderate change in the status quo than Congress acting alone would have
enacted.
The Framers contemplated the following consequences from the model of
lawmaking described above: First, most social and economic problems
would not generate legislation at all. The Framers expected the House, Sen-
ate, and President to have widely dispersed preferences about the status quo,
and therefore the no-statute game (Case 2) was most likely in the short
term.3 4 Nevertheless, the Framers expected that, if the problem persisted
over time, a solution in the common interest would emerge and preferences
would realign (from Case 2 to Case 1 or 3) so that a statute could pass. 35
Second, if a social or economic problem were to stimulate legislative action,
the structure of the Article I, Section 7 game would militate in favor of mod-
erate rather than radical shifts from the status quo.3 6 The games suggested
in Cases 1 and 3 push policy away from extreme preferences. Third, once
legislation was enacted into law, it would be interpreted over time to reflect
the original policy balance. 37 This point requires some elaboration of the
Framers' expectations about law implementation (as opposed to lawmaking,
explored above).
The Constitution separates lawmaking (Article I) from law implementa-
tion (Articles II and III). The Framers believed that Congress would be less
likely to pass "tyrannical" laws if there were the possibility that such laws
could be applied to members of Congress or their supporters. 38 But the
Framers also believed that the policy balance achieved in a given statute
would not be disturbed by the President's "execution" of laws or the Court's
"interpretation" of laws. 39 The reason for the Framers' belief was their un-
derstanding that Congress-with-the-President (the lawmaking process in Ar-
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
35. See EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 177-78.
36. See THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 384-85 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
37. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468-69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see EP-
STEIN, supra note 26, at 129-30 (tracing idea from Locke and Montesquieu to the Framers, and
explaining Madison's probable understanding of Montesquieu to be that "if the legislators cannot
ensure a tyrannical execution, i.e., one which favors themselves, they will be less likely to make
tyrannical laws for fear that they themselves will be tyrannically ruled by them.").
39. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 70, 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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ticle I, Section 7) is the constitutionally required process for deliberation and
choice regarding statutory policy, and their further understanding that the
processes of execution and interpretation would be faithful to the policy
choices of the lawmaking process. 4°
II. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
GAME AND THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
The world of the Framers is not our world. The modem administrative
state in which we live is much more complicated than the republic envisioned
by the Framers. This complexity has engendered an amount of lawmaking
and legal regulation inconceivable to the Framers. More important, in the
modem administrative state most "lawmaking" is accomplished by agencies
under the authority of statutory delegations. Most important, this shift to
agency lawmaking has been accompanied by an overall shift of lawmaking
authority from Congress to the President.
These modem developments are in tension with the specific as well as gen-
eral balance sought by the Framers through Article I, Section 7. Specifically,
the modem developments have shifted statutory policy away from the com-
promise among House, Senate, and presidential preferences reflected in the
game set up by Article I, Section 7. Since agency heads are appointed by the
President and many agencies are located within the executive department,
presidential preferences are now much more important to lawmaking than
the Framers originally intended. Generally, the modem developments-es-
pecially the increased lawmaking power of the President-have unsettled the
balance between popular government and stability, to the detriment of
both.4
1
If the Court is truly serious about the Framers' original expectations as to
the meaning of Article I, Section 7, as the Court claimed to be in Chadha
42
the Court should be more attentive to the ways in which agency lawmaking
unsettles those expectations. In the remainder of this Part, we consider the
ways in which the game outlined in Part I provides insight into the validity
of several constitutional doctrines: the nondelegation doctrine, the legislative
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468-69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It
can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their
own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature."); see EPSTEIN, supra note 26, at 173
("[E]xecution does not really require much deliberation, perhaps because it does not present many
choices. To execute well means to execute vigorously whatever laws there are against whatever
lawbreakers there are. The choices which require deliberation are apparently made by the
legislature.").
41. We reserve to Part III discussion of the practical problems involved with unstable policy in
modem society.
42. 462 U.S. 919, 945-51 (1983).
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veto and its severability from the underlying legislation, congressional acqui-
escence as lawmaking, congressional efforts to control agencies, judicial def-
erence to agency interpretations, and the use of legislative history in
interpreting statutes. We emphasize that the normative perspective for this
Part's analysis is that of Chadha, namely, the original expectations of the
Framers. We reserve for Part III discussion of these doctrines from a non-
originalist perspective.
A. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DILEMMA POSED BY THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Modern American government is structurally quite different from the gov-
emnment envisioned by the Framers. A great deal of national lawmaking has
been delegated 43 by Congress to administrative agencies, with little or no
specific standards to guide the agencies. As a result, most initial efforts at
statutory interpretation are now done by agency rulemaking and adjudica-
tion, rather than in the context of judicial adjudication. 44 There are numer-
ous reasons for Congress's willingness to delegate significant lawmaking
power to agencies, including the institutional advantages agencies have in
developing detailed policy prescriptions and the congressional inclination to
avoid or defer controversial policy decisions. Whatever the reasons, such
delegation is in tension with the original constitutional understanding that
lawmaking would be accomplished by Congress-with-the-President, and with
the policies underlying that understanding. Specifically, the Framers did not
expect the President to have an active role in lawmaking and in changing the
law; the executive's role, reflected in the veto power, was only reactive, pro-
tecting the presidency against congressional usurpation or the status quo
against immediate popular change.45
In the federal system, the nondelegation doctrine is, theoretically, sup-
posed to police standardless congressional delegations to agencies. But the
nondelegation doctrine has not been invoked by the Supreme Court to strike
down legislation since the New Deal.46 For example, in 1989 a unanimous
43. By "delegation," we are mainly thinking of delegation on the face of the statute, to the effect
that the agency is affirmatively charged with developing regulations to fill out the framework as well
as the details of statutory policy. This is the way delegation is usually used in the legal literature.
We would also include statutes that charge an agency with implementing vague statutory mandates,
even when there is no formal language delegating lawmaking tasks to the agency.
44. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369, 372-85 (1989).
45. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442-43 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(dual purpose of veto is to enable the President to "defend himself against the depredations" of
Congress and to prevent "the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design").
46. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGIS-
LATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 473-76 (1988).
[Vol. 80:523
HeinOnline  -- 80 Geo. L.J. 534 1991-1992
THE ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 GAME
Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States47 held that Congress could dele-
gate federal sentencing guidelines to a commission made up of seven presi-
dential appointees (three of whom must be federal judges).48 The Court
applied the "intelligible principle" test but prefaced it with observations that,
"in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more
technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to
delegate power under broad general directives" 49 and that virtually any
broad standard has been held to pass the "intelligible principle" test.50 Jus-
tice Scalia's separate opinion, agreeing with the Court on this issue (and dis-
agreeing on every other issue in the case), opined that the nondelegation
doctrine is as unenforceable as it is important to the constitutional scheme. 5'
Notwithstanding Mistretta and other precedents, an enforceable nondele-
gation doctrine is not only consistent with but required by any serious effort
to respect the original constitutional understanding about lawmaking in our
polity. By requiring Congress-with-the-President to set statutory policy (x)
on the face of the statute, the nondelegation doctrine curtails the freedom of
agencies to move statutory policy, and hence might be a useful means for
enforcing the original understanding of Article I, Section 7 in the modem
administrative state. This is the first normative lesson of our game theoretic
model: when it fails to make clear its policy choices in statutes delegating
lawmaking to agencies, Congress has violated a most fundamental rule and
policy in Article I of the Constitution. Unpoliced delegation of lawmaking
authority to agencies represents a major amendment in the Constitution's
procedures for lawmaking, and such an amendment has important conse-
quences for the balance and allocation of national power. Because agencies
are influenced or even controlled by the President,52 the transfer of lawmak-
ing authority from Congress-with-the-President (the Article I, Section 7
structure) to agencies significantly increases the importance of the Presi-
dent's preferences in the lawmaking process.
Consider the alignment of preferences in Case 1 (see Figure 1), in which
47. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
48. Id. at 371-79.
49. Id. at 372.
50. Id. at 373.
51. Id at 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting from the Court's opinion but joining the Court on this
single issue).
52. Many agencies are within the executive branch (e.g., the Internal Revenue Service, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service) and hence under the direct thumb of the President, who can fire
top officials. Other agencies are "independent" of the executive branch (e.g., the Federal Trade
Commission, the Federal Communication Commission); although their top officials cannot be fired
at will by the President, they are appointed by the President for limited terms. And in the 1980s the
Office of Management and Budget took on authority to oversee rulemaking by independent as well
as executive branch agencies. See Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President
and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986).
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the Article I, Section 7 structure for lawmaking would yield a statutory pol-
icy falling somewhere between the preferred policies of the two legislative
chambers (H < x < S). In the modem administrative state, Congress often
will not pass a statute setting policy precisely at x, but will instead pass a
statute delegating the policy-setting function to an agency (A), with the ex-
pectation that the agency will implement policy at x, or thereabouts. In that
event, the agency can (perhaps over time) set policy virtually anywhere it
wants, unless Congress would be stimulated to override the agency's choice
by enacting new legislation. Thus, in Case 1 situations the agency with pol-
icy preferences near those of the President can propose any policy, x , at or to
the right of the veto median of the more pro-President chamber, and Con-
gress cannot successfully challenge this interpretation. Any attempt to do so
would be vetoed and the veto could not be overridden because the pivotal
voter for an override, h, likes the agency policy, x = h, more than any other
policy choice. Thus, instead of x-the policy that would have been adopted
under the Article I, Section 7 procedures-the administrative state produces
x'. This is reflected in Figure IA below:
x x
P h s H S SQ
A
FIGURE 1A. Statutory policy shifts from H < x < S to x' = h, if
Congress delegates lawmaking authority to agency.
Obviously, this represents a substantial shift in policy toward the preferences
of the President and away from those of most members of Congress.
A less dramatic story occurs in Case 3.53 Again, because the starting point
for the lawmaking game is the agency's and not Congress's decision, the
agency can set statutory policy at the more favorable veto median (x' = h)
rather than the point (x = h(SQ)) that would have prevailed under the origi-
nal structure for lawmaking. While in Case 3 Congress's position as poli-
cymaker induced it to set x as far to the right of h as it could, Congress will
not respond to the agency's moving policy further to the left, because any
effort to overrule the agency's interpretation will be met by a presidential
53. Case 2, which did not yield a statute in the first place, does not concern the present analysis.
But note that a Presidency with substantial lawmaking power, which might fuel further lawmaking
ambitions, can be expected to assert lawmaking authority over areas where there has never been
enough political consensus to pass a statute. For example, there will be situations where the Presi-
dent will try to assert his "inherent powers" to cover Case 2 situations. Or the President/agency
may try to interpret the jurisdictional limits of related statutes broadly, in order to impose their
interpretations into areas essentially covered by Case 2. This is what the President argued, and the
Court accepted, in Dames & Moore.
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veto that cannot be overridden in one of the chambers. Figure 3A diagrams
this version of the game:
X X
P h h(SQ) s H S
A
FIGURE 3A. Statutory policy shifts from h < x = h(SQ), to x' = h
when Congress delegates lawmaking authority to agency.
The shift in statutory policy here is less dramatic than in Case 1, from x
h(SQ) to x' = h, but it is still potentially significant. Indeed, the more Con-
gress originally wanted to change the status quo in Case 3 situations (and
therefore the greater the gulf between h and SQ), the bigger will be the move-
ment from x to x'. These are the situations where Article I, Section 7 law-
making would have reflected a particularly striking compromise of
congressional preferences, and delegation of lawmaking authority to an
agency makes the compromise more acute.
Thus far, our discussion has assumed that congressional and presidential
preferences do not change over time. Of course, those preferences do change,
and electoral politics has produced dramatic shifts in presidential preferences
in particular.54 Figure 3B maps the shift in statutory policy in Case 3 statutes
when there is a dramatic left-to-right switch in presidential preferences (as
there was in 1981):
Xf X X* X *f
P SQ h h(SQ) s H S h* s* P*
A A*
FIGURE 3B. Administrative policy moves from x' = h to x*' = s*
when President shifts from P to P*.
54. Vide the dramatic shifts in 1953 from Truman to Eisenhower, in 1961 from Eisenhower to
Kennedy, in 1969 from Johnson to Nixon, in 1977 from Ford to Carter, and in 1981 from Carter to
Reagan. In contrast, congressional elections have yielded remarkably few abrupt policy shifts dur-
ing this period. The only dramatic shifts occurred in 1959 (slender Democratic majorities in Con-
gress to substantial Democratic majorities), and 1981 (Democratic Senate to Republican Senate,
with working Republican majority in the House on some issues). Less dramatic shifts occurred in
1953 (slim Democratic majorities to slim Republican majorities in Congress), 1955 (switch back to
Democratic Congress), and 1987 (Democrats regain control of Senate). Note here that this experi-
ence is contrary to the Framers' expectations, which were that the preferences of the popularly
elected House of Representatives would fluctuate more dramatically than those of the indirectly
elected Senate and President.
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Consider Figures 3, 3A, and 3B as a sequential pattern. The Case 3 statute
that should result from lawmaking by Congress-with-the-President (the Arti-
cle I, Section 7, Clause 2 procedures) already strongly reflects the President's
preferences (policy would be set at x = h(SQ)), but if an agency is given
lawmaking authority, then policy is pushed more strongly toward the Presi-
dent's preferences (x' = h). After an election that shifts presidential prefer-
ences to P* (such as the 1952, 1968, or 1980 elections), lawmaking that
followed Article I, Section 7 procedures could amend the statute to shift pol-
icy to a position like x*, between H and S, but lawmaking originally dele-
gated to a presidentially controlled agency shifts policy much more
dramatically to x *" = s *. This sequence suggests that agency lawmaking can
sometimes result in drastic shifts in policy from one Presidency to the next
(from x' to x*')--much more dramatic shifts than would be observed within
the framework of the original understanding (from x to x*).
In our model, the introduction of agencies as delegated lawmakers shifts
policy deliberation in our bicameral presidential system away from the origi-
nal constitutional understanding: not only is it often difficult for one or both
chambers of Congress to enact statutes reflecting their preferences (Case 3)
as the Framers originally intended, but even when statutes are enacted in
situations where congressional preferences ought to be dominant (Case 1),
Congress's tendency to delegate ultimate policymaking choices to agencies
pushes policy in these situations toward presidential preferences as well (Fig-
ure 1A). And over time, the original agency policy choice, wherever situated,
is vulnerable to abrupt change in response to shifting presidential prefer-
ences (Figure 3B).
Stated another way, the Framers' modest restraints on congressional
power to enact statutes reflecting legislative preferences has in the modern
state given way to a substantial transfer of legislative power from Congress to
the President. Whatever the modern normative justifications for such a
transfer of power, this phenomenon is a significant abandonment of funda-
mental choices made by the Framers regarding lawmaking, as expressed in
Article I, Section 7. The failure of the modern Supreme Court to enforce the
nondelegation doctrine has significant consequences for the allocation of na-
tional power between the branches.
Positive political theory suggests that Congress would try to find ways
around the reallocation of lawmaking power outlined above, and Congress
has in fact been responding to this phenomenon for the last fifty years. In-
deed, once Congress became aware of the constitutional dilemma outlined
above, Congress should have factored that problem into its overall willing-
ness to pass statutes delegating lawmaking authority to agencies. For exam-
ple, we should expect that Congress would not pass general delegation
statutes in Case 1 situations unless it had some assurance that the implement-
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ing agency would not immediately seek to move policy from the probable
congressional preferences, x, to the veto median, x' (see Figure 1A).
Unfortunately (for Congress), many of the broad delegating statutes were
enacted in periods when Congress was either not aware of this phenomenon
or had policy preferences similar to those of the President (e.g., the New
Deal and the Great Society). Because statutes have an indefinite life, a broad
delegation in 1937 (when the preferences of Congress and the President were
congruent on many issues) still had important consequences in 1987 (when
the political preferences of Congress and the President were very different).
Relatedly, Congress may underestimate the erosion of its power over time.
Even if Congress and the agency in year one have an understanding about
where policy will be set, that understanding does not necessarily bind the
agency in year twenty-one (this is one lesson of Chevron). This phenomenon
creates a long-term constitutional dilemma, in which Congress over time
loses lawmaking authority to the President. How might Congress respond to
the constitutional dilemma?
The traditional congressional response to the dilemma has been to try to
prevent the agency's preferences from reflecting those of the President-in
other words, to ensure that P < A. To the extent that Congress can pressure
the agency to implement the statutory policy as originally agreed, it will do
so. Congress is not without means to influence agency preferences. Congress
can monitor agencies by oversight hearings, budgetary constraints, and infor-
mal contacts. Congress can also structure the agency to reduce the Presi-
dent's power to affect agency preferences; an agency located outside of the
executive department (namely, an independent administrative agency) is
headed by officials who cannot be easily removed by the President and who
may be more responsive to congressional monitoring.
55
These responses surely have an effect on agency preferences in many (and
probably most) instances, but are not a panacea for the constitutional di-
lemma described here. To begin with, agencies located within the executive
branch ought to be less susceptible to congressional monitoring because the
President has direct control over the agency: the President can fire its lead-
ers. Thus, when the President has a firm preference on the policy issue, that
preference will often exercise a more powerful constraint on the agency than
congressional monitoring. Moreover, the congressional monitoring is done
not by Congress as a whole, but by its committees. Many committees are not
representative of their chamber, and when committee preferences run in the
same direction as presidential and agency preferences there will be less effec-
tive monitoring. Finally, it is not clear that even vigorous and effective con-
55. Also, the Senate can sometimes affect agency policy by its confirmation power. It can head
off presidential nomination of "extreme" agency chiefs. The confirmation power is more useful for
controlling independent agencies, whose heads cannot be fired by the President.
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gressional monitoring can move agency preferences all the way to the
statutory policy that would have been adopted pursuant to the Article I,
Section 7 procedures. In other words, Congress can shift A to the right of P
in most cases, but can it shift A all the way to the original statutory equilib-
rium (H < A < S, for Case 1 statutes)? This seems most unlikely, especially
for agencies that are part of the executive department.
The problems with congressional monitoring, especially for executive
agencies, suggest that a Congress concerned with the constitutional dilemma
described in the previous Section would find other ways to correct for this
pro-President bias in agency lawmaking. Again, this is what we find, histori-
cally. Congress has sought to offset agency bias in at least three other
ways-the legislative veto of agency rulemaking, delegation of responsibili-
ties to congressionally-dominated agents, and procedural checks on agency
rulemaking, especially the availability of judicial review to correct pro-Presi-
dent agency interpretations. The remainder of this Part will explore the va-
lidity of constitutional restrictions the Supreme Court placed on these
strategies in the 1980s. The analysis we have introduced in this article makes
us more sympathetic to these mechanisms than the Supreme Court has been.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE VETO AS A RESPONSE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DILEMMA: CHADHA
A legislative veto is a provision that an agency rule or action can be voided
by the action of Congress without presentment (two-house veto), or of one
chamber of Congress (one-house veto), or of one committee of Congress
(committee veto). By avoiding presentment, the legislative veto makes it eas-
ier for Congress, or a subgroup, to respond to agency interpretations which
push statutory policy toward the President's preferences. In the 1930s, at
precisely the time when the modern administrative state was aborning, Con-
gress began to attach legislative vetoes to statutes delegating lawmaking
functions to agencies. By 1982 there were hundreds of legislative vetoes in
federal statutes, 56 and thousands more in state statutes. 57
In 1983, the Supreme Court invalidated a one-house veto of an agency
adjudication in Chadha,5 8 and subsequent summary dispositions expanded
the holding to two-house vetoes and vetoes of agency rulemaking. 59 As
noted in the introduction to this article, Chadha's reasoning rested upon the
56. See Joseph Cooper, The Legislative Veto in the 1980s, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra
note 30, at 364, 367; see also Jacob K. Javits & Gary J. Klein, Congressional Oversight and the
Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis; 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455-58, 496 (1977).
57. See L. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies:
Models and Alternatives, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 81-83 (1982).
58. 462 U.S. at 959.
59. See, e.g., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. 1216
(1983) (summary invalidation of one-house veto of independent agency rulemaking); United States
[V/ol. 80:523
HeinOnline  -- 80 Geo. L.J. 540 1991-1992
THE ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 GAME
original intent of the Framers. 6 But Chadha's focus on the original consti-
tutional understanding is unhelpful because it ignores the ways in which del-
egation of lawmaking power to agencies has already destroyed the original
constitutional balance. To the extent that the Court is concerned with pro-
tecting-or restoring-some of the original balance of lawmaking influence
suggested by Article I, Section 7, the two-house veto is constitutionally de-
fensible, as is the one-house veto under certain assumptions.
In the short term, a legislative veto would have little consequence for the
statutes described in Case 3 above, in which SQ < h. In these situations, the
advent of agency rulemaking shifts statutory policy only slightly toward the
President's preferences (from h < x = h(SQ) to x' = h). 61 Because a veto
of the agency's rule (x' = h) would leave Congress with a status quo that it
likes even less than the agency's rule (SQ < h), Congress would not ration-
ally exercise its veto authority. This scenario reflects a fundamental limita-
tion of the legislative veto as a policy tool: unlike override legislation, which
can not only negate the agency's rule but can implement the rule Congress
wants, the legislative veto merely negates the agency's rule, leaving the status
quo in its place.
The effect of the legislative veto is more readily apparent for statutes de-
scribed in Case 1, namely, those statutes whose policy direction was sup-
ported by all the actors, with the President favoring a more radical change in
the status quo than the Congress. Recall Figure IA, which revealed a dra-
matic shift in statutory policy from delegation of lawmaking to agencies
(from H < x < S to x' = h). The introduction of a two-house legislative
veto in these statutes would reverse this dramatic shift, though it is doubtful
that it would restore policy to the original Article I, Section 7 balance (H <
x < S). Figure IB maps the new game introduced by a two-house veto:
62
x x x
P A h H(SQ) s H S SQ
FIGURE lB. Statutory policy shifts from x' = h to x" = H(SQ) when
two-house veto is introduced.
Letting H(SQ) stand for the point that the median member of the House-
the chamber closer to the position of the President-regards as indifferent to
Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (summary invalidation of two-house veto of independent
agency rulemaking).
60. 462 U.S. at 945-51.
61. See supra Figure 3A.
62. The effect of congressional monitoring of administrative agencies discussed in Part II.A is
represented in this and subsequent figures as P < A.
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SQ, we see that if the agency sets policy at x" < H(SQ), both chambers of
Congress would veto the agency's decision and overturn it in favor of SQ.
The agency can avoid a two-house veto by setting its rule at the point where
the more pro-President chamber is indifferent as to that point and the status
quo (x" = H(SQ)).63 For Case I statutes, the introduction of a two-house
legislative veto shifts the outcome "weakly" in the direction of the equilib-
rium position suggested by Article I, Section 7.
The introduction of a one-house veto would yield a more pronounced shift
toward the original legislative preferences for Case 1 statutes, in some cases
yielding a policy not so distant from the Article I, Section 7 equilibrium posi-
tion. Consider Figure 1c:
x x x
P A h s S(SQ) H S SQ
FIGURE IC. Statutory policy shifts from x' = h to x" = S(SQ) when
one-house veto is introduced.
Under a one-house veto, the agency would have to set statutory policy at or
to the right of the points where both legislative chambers are indifferent be-
tween the agency's policy and the status quo (x" = S(SQ)).
Finally, consider the effect of a legislative veto for a Case 1 statute in the
longer term. Figure 1D maps the effect of a radical change in presidential
preferences compared with a legislative veto for a Case 1 statute:
X' X1 X* X*'
P A h s S(SQ) H S h* SQ s* A* P*
FIGURE ID. Statutory policy shifts from x" = S(SQ) to x* = SQ with
legislative veto, when presidential preferences shift
globally.
Whereas without a legislative veto, a shift in the President's position from P
to P* would shift policy from x' = h to x* = s * with a one-house legislative
veto, the outcomes would shift only from x" = S(SQ) to x* = SQ. There-
fore, the change in policy following a large shift in presidential position is
generally smaller under a one-house veto than without a veto. Similar rea-
soning would show that the two-house veto has intermediate effects.
To summarize our argument at this point: The rise of the administrative
63. Note that ifSQ is sufficiently far to the right, H(SQ) will be to the left ofh. In that event, the
agency would set policy at x" = h; it would not set policy to the left of the veto median, h, because
Congress would then enact veto-proof corrective legislation. For a discussion of how and why this
movement occurs, see supra Part I, Case 3.
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state has substantially subverted the original constitutional understanding by
vesting much lawmaking in agencies. Congressional monitoring of agencies
(especially those located in the executive department) is not a completely
effective remedy for this constitutional dilemma. The introduction of a two-
house legislative veto has the effect of moving policy outcomes back toward
those that would occur under the original understanding. These effects are
most significant in Case 1 statutes, where the President and Congress both
object to the status quo and favor reform in the same direction, but have
different preferences about how much the status quo should be changed. The
effects are less significant in Case 3 statutes, but often ameliorate the consti-
tutional dilemma there as well. Moreover, the two-house veto's effects hold
for both the short term (in which preferences remain the same) as well as the
long term (in which the President's preferences change but Congress's re-
main stable). In all cases, the two-house veto works to offset the President's
power to change statutory policy through his control of agencies (especially
executive agencies), though it does not completely restore the original statu-
tory compromise.
Under the perspective of the original constitutional understanding adopted
in Chadha, there are also good arguments for one-house legislative vetoes,
because such vetoes can move statutory policy back much closer to the origi-
nal equilibrium, notwithstanding agency bias. On the other hand, our analy-
sis suggests at least one argument against one-house legislative vetoes. If the
preferences of one chamber of Congress change drastically over time, while
those of the President and the other chamber remain stable, then the new
"outlier" chamber may veto statutory policies that precisely envision the
original policy choices, x. We do not consider this a likely scenario, in part
because congressional preferences in the post-World War II era do change
more slowly than those of the President, and they usually change in conjunc-
tion with a change in presidential preferences."M But this is a potential draw-
back to the one-house veto in particular.
In short, although Chadha itself was correctly decided, for the reasons set
out in Justice Powell's opinion concurring in the judgment,65 the opinion's
reasoning misinterprets the original constitutional understanding, and sum-
mary decisions striking down legislative vetoes of agency rulemaking are in-
correct, from the perspective of the original understanding.
64. The only time in the post-New Deal era that one chamber of Congress has shifted from one
party to another, without a corresponding shift in the other chamber, was in 1980, when President
Reagan's coattails pulled in a Republican Senate, with the House of Representatives remaining
Democratic (though a little more conservative). The Senate shifted back to the Democrats in 1986.
65. 462 U.S. at 959-67 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell would not have reached the ques-
tion of the validity of legislative vetoes. Instead he reasoned that the one-house veto in this case was
a judicial act beyond the scope of Congress's constitutionally prescribed authority.
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C. CONGRESSIONALLY DOMINATED AGENTS AS A SOLUTION
TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA: BOWSHER AND
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON
A second approach to the constitutional dilemma outlined above would be
for Congress to delegate lawmaking power to agencies that the President
does not dominate. This is probably one reason for the growth of "independ-
ent" agencies. Although independent agencies have been questioned as in-
consistent with the Constitution's separation of powers in Articles I-III, they
are positively useful in ameliorating the tension between Article I, Section 7
and the extensive delegation of lawmaking responsibilities by Congress, and
hence are a constitutionally permissible response to the constitutional di-
lemma. Such agencies are most useful to Congress when they are not slanted
toward the President. Unhappily, that is not necessarily the case. The Presi-
dent's power to appoint and (with statutory qualifications) remove agency
commissioners gives the President substantial influence over many "in-
dependent" agencies.
Disappointed with the performance of independent agencies, Congress has
sometimes delegated important lawmaking responsibilities to agencies that it,
rather than the President, could control. This was an important issue in
Bowsher v. Synar,66 in which the Court invalidated the Gramm-Rudman
Act's 67 plan for eliminating the federal budget deficit over time. Under the
Act, the President's Office of Management and Budget and the Congres-
sional Budget Office jointly determine how much the anticipated federal
budget must be cut to meet the Act's targets. Then, the Act directs the
Comptroller General to decide exactly where budget cuts should be made in
order to meet the deficit reduction targets each year. The constitutional
challenge grew out of Congress's potential control over the Comptroller
General, who is appointed from a list supplied by Congress and can be re-
moved "for cause" by Congress, and not by the President. The Court major-
ity in Bowsher invalidated this plan on general separation of powers grounds,
as a legislative usurpation of executive powers.68 Concurring in the judg-
ment, Justices Stevens and Marshall believed the plan violated Article I, Sec-
tion 7 because it delegated important legislative powers to an agent of
Congress.
69
Justice Stevens recently wrote on this issue for a majority of the Court in
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, Inc. 70 The case involved a statutory transfer of federal con-
66. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
67. 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
68. 478 U.S. at 721-27.
69. Id. at 737-41 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
70. 111 S. Ct. 2298 (1991).
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trol of Dulles and National Airports to a regional authority (the MWAA),
conditioned upon its supervision by a board of review having veto power over
its decisions and composed of nine members of Congress.7' The Court held
that this statutory scheme was invalid however the board of appeals is de-
scribed. 72 If its duties were executive, the scheme would violate separation of
powers as analyzed in Bowsher. If its duties were legislative, the scheme
would violate Article I, Section 7 as analyzed in Chadha.
Our game theoretic model of the original understanding provides a basis
for criticizing the Court's approach and result in Bowsher and in Metropoli-
tan Washington. The analysis turns on what kind of statute is at stake. Bow-
sher involved a Case 1 statute, in which both Congress and the President very
much wanted to change the status quo, but the President wanted a more
dramatic change than Congress. The Gramm-Rudman Act reflected con-
gressional preferences to cut the budget deficit (SQ), as well as Congress's
desire to delegate authority to make specific cuts (because Congress wanted
flexibility in the plan but did not want to revisit the issue itself every year).
On the other hand, Congress did not want to delegate that authority to the
President, because Congress feared that the President would use any budget-
cutting authority to delete programs Congress wanted. This created a di-
lemma for Congress: How could it achieve its goal of reducing the deficit
without ceding critical budget policy decisions to the President? Congress's
solution was to delegate to the Comptroller General-not the President or an
executive agency-the power to make the specific decisions. The President
did not like this and objected to it, but he did not veto the law because he
preferred the congressional solution to the status quo.
For Case 1 statutes like the Gramm-Rudman Act, Congress's delegation
of lawmaking responsibilities to an agent it, rather than the President, con-
trols is responsive to, rather than contrary to, the equilibrium required by
Article I, Section 7. Recall Figure 1, which maps the equilibrium policy for
Case 1 statutes at a compromise point between House and Senate prefer-
ences. Presidential preferences do not figure prominently because the Presi-
dent cannot credibly threaten to veto legislation which moves policy away
from the status quo and toward presidential preferences (even if just a little
bit). In enacting such a statute, Congress realizes that it cannot anticipate all
the hard choices over the years and that it will have to delegate. But Con-
gress in the 1980s was aware of Figure IA: if it delegates decisionmaking
power to the President or an executive agency, statutory policy will shift
toward the veto median of the more pro-President chamber. To avoid that
result and preserve the original equilibrium, the Gramm-Rudman Act dele-
71. Id at 2301.
72. Id. at 2312.
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gated to an agent more responsive to Congress, thereby preserving the equi-
librium mapped in Figure 1 and suggested by Article I, Section 7. Hence,
Justice Stevens was wrong to argue in Bowsher that the statute violated Arti-
cle I, Section 7. Indeed, since the delegation was an effort by Congress to
preserve the equilibrium mandated by Article I, Section 7, the Bowsher ma-
jority was wrong to conclude that the delegation represented a congressional
"usurpation" of executive power. 73
In the short term, for Case 1 statutes, the Court would be faithful to the
original dynamics of lawmaking to permit Congress to exercise some control
over the agency implementing policy. As with the one-house legislative veto,
the main constitutional problem with such an arrangement is that congres-
sional preferences will change over time, and the agent's implementation will
change with it, as mapped in Figure lE:
x X* X
P h s H S h* s* H* A S*
FIGURE 1E. Statutory policy shifts from H < x < S to H* < x*' <
S* when Congress controls agency and congressional
preferences shift globally.
If there is a global shift in congressional preferences to the right, congressio-
nally controlled implementation will shift statutory policy (x*') far away
from the original policy (x), much further away than presidentially con-
trolled implementation (x*).
This scenario is the only legitimate risk that Bowsher prevents, but we
doubt it is much of a risk. The reason is that when congressional preferences
shift so markedly, the shift has usually been presidentially led-that is, the
biggest shifts in congressional preferences have been in connection with land-
slide victories for similarly minded Presidents (1932, 1948, 1952, 1964,
1980). While off-year elections also yield shifts, usually against the Presi-
dent, they do not tend to be so global and important (1938, 1946, 1950, 1954,
1958, 1966, 1982, 1986). If the President shifts along with Congress, then
Figure 1E would show a new Presidential position (P*) also located along the
righthand part of the spectrum. In that event, Congress could reach the new
equilibrium point (x*') following normal Article I, Section 7 procedures.
Case 3 statutes present a much more favorable field for Justice Stevens's
analysis in Bowsher and Metropolitan Washington because congressional con-
trol over the implementing agency would dramatically shift statutory policy
from the Article I, Section 7 equilibrium point, as mapped in Figure 3c:
73. See supra text accompanying note 68.
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x x
P SQ h h(SQ) s H A S
FIGURE 3c. Policy shifts from x = h(SQ) to H < x' < S, if Congress
delegates lawmaking authority to congressional agent.
This is obviously a dramatic shift in the equilibrium policy, from a point
close to the veto median of the more pro-president chamber (h(SQ)) to a
point reflecting a compromise between the two chambers but ignoring the
President's preferences. For Case 3 statutes, the shift in statutory policy rep-
resented by delegation to a congressionally dominated agency is more dra-
matic than the shift represented by delegation to a presidentially dominated
agency (compare Figure 3c to Figure 3A above). This is the sort of situation
the Court should discourage, and Justice Stevens's analysis seems appropri-
ate for Case 3 statutes.
Unhappily, this same analysis suggests that Case 3 statutes will rarely in-
clude a provision for congressionally dominated agencies. Because such a
provision would negate the President's preferences in the statute's implemen-
tation, the President could successfully veto any bill creating such an agency,
thereby forcing Congress to back down in order to obtain a statute. Partly
for this reason, it appears that the statute in Metropolitan Washington was
not a Case 3 statute; the President (having Air Force One and Andrews Air
Force Base to land it) had no stake in the ultimate policy equilibrium and
probably would have gone along with a wide range of congressional policy
choices, including the review board provision. This makes the case look
pretty much like Bowsher; therefore, Article I, Section 7 was not seriously
implicated, contrary to the Court's opinion in Metropolitan Washington.
D. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION AS A RESPONSE TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA: CHEVRON
In the 1930s, at the same time that legislative vetoes were being introduced
into legislation, the legal and political community was also debating the
scope of judicial review of agency rulemaking (a debate that long predated
the 1930s). One consequence of this debate was the Administrative Proce-
dure Act of 1946 (APA),7 4 which assured that agency rulemaking would
ordinarily be subject to judicial review. What was not thoroughly addressed
by the APA was how scrutinizing courts should be of agency lawmaking,
and Supreme Court practice and doctrine has run in many different direc-
tions. In 1984, however, the Court clarified its position on review of agency
74. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (Supp. 1989-1990).
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rulemaking75 in Chevron US.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council.76
In reasoning that the Court has broadly applied since 1984, Chevron held
that constitutional separation of powers requires courts to defer to any rea-
sonable agency interpretation of statutes it is charged with implementing,
77
and that such deference is not undermined by an agency's changing positions
in response to presidential preferences.7 Chevron has been subjected to keen
criticism by at least some legal commentators,79 and we join the critics of
Chevron. From the perspective of the original constitutional design, aggres-
sive judicial review of agency rulemaking ameliorates the constitutional di-
lemma, under which the modem administrative state has witnessed a shift of
lawmaking power from Congress to the President.
If there is sufficient evidence in the statute or the legislative history for the
original policy equilibrium in the statute, and if judges saw their role as en-
forcing such statutory guidance, then judicial review becomes a powerful
mechanism for redressing at least some of the constitutional imbalance.
Under these circumstances, the effect of judicial review is obviously benefi-
cial, because courts then become mechanisms for moving usurpative agency-
set policy (x') back to the original statutory policy (x) set by Congress-with-
the-President. Under these circumstances, it is easy to say that Chevron is
wrong, or at least should be narrowly read, from the perspective of the origi-
nal understanding embodied in Article I, Section 7. Chevron suggests, how-
ever, that for many cases the statutory equilibrium will be unknowable to the
Court, and under conditions of uncertainty the agency's preferences are more
legitimate than the Court's preferences because the former is more electorally
accountable.
But our game theoretic account of the original understanding embodied in
Article I, Section 7 suggests that judicial review is valuable even when the
statute or its legislative history provide little guidance and when the judge
only seeks to read her own preferences into the statutory policy. To explain
75. We distinguish among judicial review of (1) the correctness of agency rulemaking and statu-
tory interpretation, where the inquiry is whether the agency's interpretation of the statute is correct;
(2) the correctness of agency adjudications, which focuses on whether a trial-like result is sup-
ported to the extent required by the appropriate evidentiary standard but may also evaluate the
correctness of agency interpretations of statutes; and (3) agency adherence to proper procedures in
either type of proceeding. Although some agencies do their lawmaking only through adjudication
(e.g., the National Labor Relations Board), most do it through rulemaking, and we limit our analy-
sis in this Section to rulemaking.
76. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
77. Id. at 842-45.
78. Id. at 865-66.
79. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Admin-
istrative State., 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452 (1989).
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this argument, we now include the Court 0 (J) as a player in the Article I,
Section 7 game. That is, judges have exogenous preferences about the statu-
tory policy and try to impose them on the statute in place of the agency's
preferences, but are willing to compromise their preferences to the extent
necessary to prevent being overruled.
The Court's participation as a political player affects the game's equilib-
rium in different ways, depending upon the location of the Court's own pref-
erences. We shall develop this point by reference to three possible positions
for judicial preferences, mapped out for Case 1 statutes.8 "
Variation 1: J > S. Figure 4 maps the configuration of preferences where
those of the Court, J, are to the right of the chamber median in both the
House and Senate (J > S > H):
x xx
P A h s H S J
FIGURE 4. Statutory policy shifts from x' = h to x" = S, with judicial
review where J > S.
Judicial review introduces the Court as a decisionmaker that can create a
new default position, much as the agency has done in our earlier examples.
The agency thereby loses its policymaking advantage. If the agency sets stat-
utory policy anywhere to the left of the Senate median, S, the Court will
want to override the agency interpretation with its own preferred policy.
Anticipating future moves of the other players, the Court will not set policy
to the right of the chamber median, S, because in that event both the House
and Senate would favor legislation set at or to the left of the Senate median,
S, which the President would sign, because they all prefer S to J. As a result,
the Court will override any agency policy set to the left of the Senate median,
S. Knowing this could be the result of unconstrained judicial review, the
agency will then set policy at the chamber median, S, to avoid a judicial
overruling that would be accepted by Congress. The equilibrium result, x"
= S, is much closer to the original statutory policy, x, than was the result
without judicial review, x' = h.
Variation 2: h < J < S. If the Court's policy preferences fall between the
80. We are using "Court" to mean any reviewing court, ultimately including the Supreme Court,
whose preferences would often govern what we are calling "J".
81. We use Case 1 statutes since those statutes represent the most dramatic erosion of the origi-
nal equilibrium in the modern administrative state. Most of the points made in this section for Case
1 statutes would apply also, but with lesser force, to Case 3 statutes. For a more technical version
of this analysis that also considers the role of committees, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick- Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in
the Modern Regulatory State, J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION (forthcoming 1992) (special issue).
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Senate median, S, and the House veto median, h, the introduction of judicial
review ameliorates the constitutional dilemma, though not as much as in Va-
riation 1. Consider Figure 4A:
xf X" x
P A h s J H S
FIGURE 4A. Statutory policy shifts from x' = h to x" = J, with judi-
cial review where h < J < S.
Under this configuration of preferences, the Court has maximum freedom,
for wherever it sets policy (such that h < x" < S), its policy will be pro-
tected from override. If the Court's preferences are anywhere between those
of the two chambers (H < J < S), one of the chambers will always object to
any shift away from the new default position, J. Bicameralism protects the
Court from override. If the Court's preferences are to the left of both cham-
ber medians but not to the left of the veto median of the more pro-President
chamber (h < J < H), both chambers of Congress might want to override
the Court's decision, but the President would veto the override and one or
both chambers would not be able to override the veto. Presentment then
protects the Court's position from override.
Given these dynamics, and not wanting to be overridden itself, the agency
will anticipate the Court's power and will set policy at x" = J. Note here
that the extent to which judicial review ameliorates the constitutional di-
lemma depends upon how close the Court's preferences are to those of the
chamber medians.
Variation 3: J < &. The final variation locates the Court's preferences at
or to the left of those of the veto median of the more pro-President chamber,
as in Figure 4B:
x x
P J h s H S
A
FIGURE 4B. Statutory policy remains at x' = h, with judicial review
where J < h.
Under this configuration of preferences, the agency will set statutory policy
at the House veto median, h, and the Court will affirm on judicial review,
because both realize that any policy to the left of the veto median can be
overridden by Congress, with veto-proof margins.
The introduction of aggressive judicial review of agency action does ame-
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liorate the constitutional dilemma--sometimes substantially-under all vari-
ations, except when the Court's preferences are at or to the left of the veto
median, and in that variation the introduction of judicial review has no effect
on the dilemma (i.e., it does not aggravate it). Contrary to Chevron, aggres-
sive judicial review of agency rulemaking is not countermajoritarian in the
context of the Article I, Section 7 game. Instead. it is Chevron that may be
countermajoritarian under the circumstances of the modem administrative
state.
More importantly, this analysis suggests that aggressive judicial review is a
better way for congressional preferences to reassert themselves, than is the
legislative veto. To the extent that the Court sees itself as enforcing the origi-
nal statutory "deal" (namely, the original equilibrium result of Article I, Sec-
tion 7 game), judicial review offers the possibility of enforcing that deal
precisely against efforts by agencies to shift statutory policy. Even if the
Court sees its role as imposing its own preferences onto statutory policy, its
role will tend to push policy back toward the original deal. The Court's
independence from presidential as well as congressional pressure suggests a
greater randomness of its preferences that will affect the pro-President
agency bias, but without the potential pro-Congress bias of the one-house
legislative veto (in particular).
E. THE DEBATE OVER THE COURT'S USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As emphasized in the prior section, aggressive judicial review of agency
decisions works best to restore the Article I, Section 7 equilibrium if the
reviewing court has access to information permitting it to locate the original
equilibrium point, x. We are here equating "information" with what is con-
ventionally known as "legislative history." However, the Court's longstand-
ing use of legislative history to interpret ambiguous statutes came under
intense criticism in the 1980s from within the judiciary itself. The main crit-
ics have been Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook.8 2 Their view is that the
Court's traditional use of legislative history is in tension with Article I, Sec-
82. For Justice Scalia, see Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History (delivered be-
tween fall 1985 and spring 1986 at various law schools) (transcript on file with The Georgetown Law
Journal) (role of court to interpret statutory language, not to reconstruct intentions of Congress),
and the cases and materials collected in William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L.
REv. 621, 650-56 (1990) (summary of Justice Scalia's criticisms of the use of legislative history and
Justice Scalia's proposed alternative); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualisn The "New"
New Legal Process. 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991). For Judge Easterbrook, see In re Sinclair,
870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (legislative history "may not be used to show
an 'intent' at variance with the meaning of the text."); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original
Intent in Statutory Construction, I1 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 59, 62-66 (1988) (courts should
"look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled,
objectively reasonable user of words."). Their views are the basis for the extensive analysis in U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A
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tion 7. "Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between
Congressmen, are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law
and its presentment to the President. It is at best dangerous to assume that
all the necessary participants in the law-enactment process are acting upon
the same unexpressed assumptions. '8 3 Justice Scalia has been particularly
critical of the Court's reliance on committee reports as support for a particu-
lar statutory interpretation, and he strongly objects to their use to rebut the
deference owed to agency rules under Chevron.84 Justice Scalia's views may
have had some influence on the Court, which in the last several years has
been prone to ignore legislative history in applying Chevron's deference to
agency decisionmaking.8 5
Justice Scalia's formalist objection to legislative history in general and
committee reports in particular is that the Court's reliance on such materials
is tantamount to a Chadha-like delegation of lawmaking power to a congres-
sional subgroup (i.e., committees) and therefore suffers from the same consti-
tutional infirmity as the legislative veto. What is correct about Justice
Scalia's point is that the Court should not give committee reports the same
authority as the statute itself. What is questionable about his point is that he
fails to make out a case for ignoring committee reports altogether, as the
Court has recently noted in Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier.8 6 Justice
Scalia himself slavishly relies on dictionaries to interpret statutes, upon the
view that the members of Congress and the President would take dictionary
meanings as an "unexpressed assumption" of what the bill means. 8 7 But the
participants in the lawmaking process treat committee reports that way, as
an "unexpressed assumption" that participants rely on much more than they
rely on dictionaries. For this and other reasons, Justice Scalia's attack has
RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1989) (arguing for narrow role for legislative history).
83. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
84. See Eskridge, supra note 82, at 650-52.
85. The leading case is K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-92 (1988) (Kennedy, J.)
(to determine consistency of Customs Service regulation with implementing statute, Court looks to
particular statutory language at issue and design of statute as a whole). See also Sullivan v. Ever-
hart, 494 U.S. 83, 89 (1990) (to determine consistency of Health and Human Services department
regulations with implementing statute, look to particular statutory language and language and de-
sign of statute as a whole); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 528-29 (1990) (to determine consistency
of HHS decision with implementing statute look to statutory language and structure of statute);
Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1989) (rejecting reliance on legislative history of ER-
ISA in favor of plain meaning of statute).
86. "[C]ommon sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional information rather
than ignoring it. Legislative history materials are not generally so misleading that jurists should
never employ them in a good faith effort to discern legislative intent." Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, Ill S. Ct. 2476, 2485 n.4 (1991).
87. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2372 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dictionary
definition of "representative" used to interpret its meaning in Voting Rights Act).
[Vol. 80:523
HeinOnline  -- 80 Geo. L.J. 552 1991-1992
THE ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 GAME
drawn few allies.88
Positive political theory provides an interesting structural argument for
Justice Scalia's position. Early positive political theory argued that congres-
sional committees would tend to be populated with "outliers," that is, mem-
bers of Congress whose preferences are very unrepresentative of those of
Congress as a whole.89 Members from farm districts would cluster around
the Agriculture Committee, those with strong union constituencies around
the Labor Committee, and so forth. Since most authoritative history is cre-
ated by committees (through their hearings and reports, and floor statements
by key members), this poses a danger that such history is systematically bi-
ased and not representative of congressional preferences generally. If impor-
tant congressional committees are indeed populated by outliers, then Justice
Scalia's criticism of committee reports has greater bite.
The Scalia critique can be expressed in the argot of our Article I, Section 7
game, simplified to focus on only one chamber in the context of a Case 1
statute. Consider Figure 5, which includes the relevant committee (C) as a
new player in the Article I, Section 7 game.
x X x
P A h H C
J
FIGURE 5. Statutory policy shifts to x" = C, where Court follows
committee report to overturn agency interpretation of
statute.
Justice Scalia's fear is that slavish adherence to committee reports and other
legislative history generated by outlier committees will lead the reviewing
Court to a position, x", very far away from the agency interpretation, (x'),
without being any closer to the original Article I, Section 7 equilibrium (x).
This strikes us as a legitimate concern for any outlier situation, including
those where the outlying committee is to the left of the chamber (and aligned
with the agency).
Nevertheless, the doctrinal implications of this point are not as harsh as
those suggested by Justice Scalia. To begin with, recent positive political
theory scholarship suggests that the danger of outlier committees is not as
great as once believed. That is, Congress has few incentives to defer decision-
making responsibilities to subgroups that will systematically subvert overall
congressional preferences. And Congress has not only incentives but effec-
88. Academics have been unimpressed with Justice Scalia's arguments. Eg., Daniel A. Farber &
Phillip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent & Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988); Stephen Ross,
Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 399, 420-33.
89. The leading work is KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE (1978).
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tive means to monitor and discourage outlying committees. For these rea-
sons, a recent empirical work reports that most House committees are not
preference outliers.90
Even if congressional committees were preference outliers, it is not clear
that legislative history is valueless. The import of Article I, Section 7 is that
committee reports themselves are not "law" and are at best one type of evi-
dence to figure out the original statutory policy. To the extent there is an
outlier danger, the Court should be reluctant to follow a committee report
over an equally clear statutory provision and should seek confirming or re-
butting suggestions in the remainder of the legislative history before follow-
ing the committee report. 9' In other words, the Court should use committee
reports "critically," which has been the Court's practice in fact.92 If the out-
lier phenomenon supports any theory of legislative history, it supports, not
Justice Scalia's harsh exclusionary approach, but "imaginative reconstruc-
tion," in which the Court develops a history of the statute from all sorts of
evidence and derives a probable answer from the reconstructed policy prefer-
ences suggested by the history.93 The opinions of Justice Stevens are text-
book examples of deft and judicious reconstruction of Article I, Section 7
policy equilibria. 9
4
F. THE LEGISLATIVE ACQUIESCENCE DOCTRINE: DAMES & MOORE
Also controversial in the 1980s has been the Court's legislative acquies-
cence doctrine. Under this doctrine of statutory interpretation, the Court
will often presume that Congress "acquiesces" in settled interpretations of
the statute by the Supreme Court, lower court consensus, or administrative
90. KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 105-50 (1991) (most
congressional committees are not preference outliers and are roughly "representative" of their
chambers).
91. For example, the views of the President can be gleaned from the committee hearings, which
almost always focus on the views of executive branch officials. Hearings also may reflect early deals
that are struck. Floor colloquy represent an opportunity for members objecting to committee re-
port language to set forth their views, and presidential signing statements have been used for this
purpose as well.
92. See Eskridge, supra note 82, at 626-40 (describing the Court's traditional practice).
93. This theory is associated with Judge Learned Hand. See, e.g., Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v.
Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 705 (1915) (statutes such as one so
strictly defining the word employee as to work an injustice on an injured contractor, "should be
construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind
them"). It has been further popularized by Judge Richard Posner. Eg., RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-87 (1985) (in deciding application of statute to
case, judge should "put himself in the shoes of the enacting legislators").
94. See, e-g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511-24 (1989) (Stevens, J.) (inter-
pretation of FED. R. EvID. 609 through thorough examination of history leading to rule's enact-
ment); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-43 (1987) (Stevens, J.) (interpretation of
Immigration and Nationality Act through examination of legislative history).
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agencies. 9" The Court invoked the acquiescence doctrine in several notable
statutory interpretation cases during the 1980s, 96 and in at least one constitu-
tional case.
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 97 the Court relied on the acquiescence doc-
trine to hold that the President has authority to enter into executive agree-
ments with foreign states that "suspend" U.S. lawsuits against those states in
U.S. courts. Although the Court held that the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act 98 does not authorize suspension of lawsuits,
99 the Court
held that the Act "invited" presidential initiatives to settle claims and that
the President was empowered to suspend lawsuits by "a history of congres-
sional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President."
1 °
The Court's holding was an amalgam of constitutional and statutory inter-
pretation: the "inviting" character of the statute, the President's prior settle-
ment of foreign claims by shifting them to claims settlement tribunals
together with Congress's acquiescence in the President's actions, and the
President's own inherent authority to deal with foreign affairs emergencies,
combined to persuade the Court that the President had authority to suspend
claims without an explicit statutory grant of power.
First suggested by the dissenting and concurring opinions in the Steel
Seizure Case, °10 the acquiescence rule as applied in Dames & Moore amounts
to a constitutional doctrine of adverse possession, through which the Presi-
dent can expand upon his inherent powers by a longstanding practice in
which Congress acquiesces. Relying on Article I, Section 7, in the pure stat-
utory interpretation context, Justice Scalia has claimed that "vindication by
congressional inaction is a canard."' 10 2 The argument would be that only
Congress acting through the Article I, Section 7 procedures10 3 can alter ap-
95. For a doctrinal and critical account of the acquiescence rule, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 71-78 (1988).
96. E.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987)
(congressional acquiescence to Title VII ruling); School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277-80 (1987)
(congressional acquiescence to HHS regulations); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
599-602 (1983) (congressional acquiescence to IRS ruling); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512, 535 (1982) (congressional acquiescence to construction of Title IX). See generally Es-
kridge, supra note 95, at 125-28 (app.1, collecting relevant cases).
97. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
98. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988).
99. 453 U.S. at 675-76. The Court also held that the "Hostage Act," 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1988),
does not authorize suspension of lawsuits either. 453 U.S. at 676-77.
100. 453 U.S. at 678-79.
101. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 701-04 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dis-
senting); id at 593-614 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 634-55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
102. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
103. Or, as in Dames & Moore, through Article II, Section 2 procedures for making treaties
(proposal from the President, ratification by the Senate).
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parent statutory rights.
The Article I, Section 7 game developed here lends support to Justice
Scalia's critique of the acquiescence doctrine generally-and in particular
with regard to Dames & Moore. Dames & Moore is a classic Case 1 situation,
where the President wants to change the status quo (a dispute with a foreign
state) much further than Congress has signified. Based upon the President's
prior practice in settling claims, the Court is willing to assume that Congress
has "acquiesced" in the President's having that power. But the Article I,
Section 7 game suggests that Congress's failure to object means virtually
nothing. Recall the game mapped by Figure IA: the President only has to
satisfy the veto median of the more pro-President chamber in order to avoid
a congressional reaction to policies set by the President. Thus, even though
the President sets policy far away from that which would result from the
Article I, Section 7 game envisioned by the Framers, Congress will not re-
spond. This is obviously not legislative acquiescence; it is executive
usurpation.
III. THE ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 GAME TODAY: ADAPTING THE
FRAMERS' VALUES TO THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The game played out in this Article seeks to understand the dynamics be-
hind the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, Section 7
as originally understood by the Framers. The main point of our analysis thus
far has been to present an originalist theory of Article I, Section 7 that better
accounts for the Framers' expectations in the modem administrative state
(where there is unpoliced delegation to executive agencies) than the original-
ist theory adopted by the Court in Chadha. We have suggested that our
originalist theory is superior to that of Chadha because it better accounts for
the overall goals of the Constitution in general and of Article I, Section 7 in
particular. 0 4 We have also suggested that the Court itself has not been able
to apply Chadha's originalist theory in a coherent way. Our Article I, Sec-
tion 7 game offers an originalist theory that can be logically applied to vari-
ous structural constitutional problems, though our game would reverse the
approach taken by the Court in a number of important constitutional cases,
from Dames & Moore to Bowsher to Chadha itself.
A central problem with our Article I, Section 7 game is that it, like
Chadha, only seeks to enforce the Framers' original values and expectations.
Many constitutional theorists reject originalist theories of constitutional ad-
104. And Chadha offers no countervailing advantages. The Court and some of its defenders
believe that Chadha offers the advantage of being faithful to the "plain meaning" of Article I, but
that is unsupportable: as Justice White argued in dissent, a legislative veto is part of legislation that
is enacted by both chambers of Congress (bicameralism) and presented to the President (present-
ment), and so satisfies the plain meaning of Article I, Section 7.
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judication, and the Justices themselves invoke such theories selectively.
What relevance does the Article I, Section 7 game have for the modem regu-
latory state in light of current post-New Deal values? This is an important
question, to which we now turn.
A. THE DIFFICULTIES OF PURE ORIGINALISM: FROM 1789 TO THE NEW
DEAL TO THE ERA OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
What ultimately makes our dynamic theory of Article I, Section 7 superior
to that in Chadha is that it provides a framework within which we can un-
derstand the effects of historical change upon the constitutional structure.
The result and reasoning in Chadha make the most sense if our polity were
exactly like the one in 1789 (represented in Figures 1-3): Congress-with-the-
President enact statutes, which are applied to specific situations by the execu-
tive and judicial branches. In such a polity, the legislative veto would be
unnecessary to any nonusurpative congressional policy.
The massive and often standardless delegation of lawmaking power to
agencies (recall Figures 1A, 3A, and 3B) both gives rise to the legislative veto
as a nonusurpative congressional response and destroys the analytical foun-
dation of Chadha-like reasoning. That is, once "lawmaking" in the federal
government becomes agency decisionmaking authorized by broad congres-
sional authorization (Chevron), or even presidential decisionmaking author-
ized by congressional acquiescence (Dames & Moore), the Article I, Section 7
game changes. No longer is it the simple game assumed by the Framers
(Figures 1-3), but it is a more complicated game in which the equilibrium
policy adopted by Congress-with-the-President is immediately subject to sig-
nificant shifts (Figures IA, 3A, and 3B).
This was the point of Justice White's dissenting opinion in Chadha:
10 5 the
New Deal changed Article I, Section 7 and generated the constitutional legit-
imacy of the legislative veto as a nonusurpative congressional response to the
new imbalance created by the President's influence over post-enactment law-
making. To deal with an enormous crisis, the New Deal Congress willingly
delegated-gave away-enormous lawmaking power to agencies. The
agency-generated policies generally mirrored those that would have been
adopted by the normal Article I, Section 7 procedures because the prefer-
ences of the President (Franklin Roosevelt) and Congress (lopsided Demo-
cratic majorities, usually very supportive of Roosevelt) were similar on most
issues. Since agencies were implementing Article I, Section 7 policy with
greater speed and expertise than Congress itself could have done, progressive
legal thought found the massive delegation unproblematic. The result was
the almost immediate death of the nondelegation doctrine. Few mourned it,
105. 462 U.S. 919, 967-74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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but with its demise was a semipermanent transfer of power from Congress to
agencies dominated or influenced by the President.
That transfer of power became more problematic during periods of conflict
between the President and Congress, especially after 1968. Since then, our
national government has (except for the Carter years) been divided between a
Republican President and a Democratic Congress.106 Not surprisingly, dur-
ing this period, each institution has been more aggressive about self-con-
sciously protecting its turf. Congress, in particular, found that much of its
power had been given away by prior Congresses and sought to avoid or re-
verse that phenomenon through mechanisms such as the legislative veto, del-
egation to congressionally controlled agencies, and reliance on judicial
review of agency action.
The implications of this historical analysis for Chadha are significant: the
Court's invocation of a static model of Article I, Section 7 oversimplifies the
constitutional problem. Once Article I, Section 7 procedures and policies
have been sacrificed-and sacrificed with the Court's constant approval
(most recently in Mistretta 07 )-by the nonenforcement of the nondelegation
doctrine, the Court cannot then pretend that the Article I, Section 7 of the
Framers' time still exists today. Yet that is what the Court tried to do in
Chadha.
But only "tried" to do. The Court's results and reasoning in other consti-
tutional cases suggest that the Court itself has not internalized its Chadha
understanding of Article I, Section 7, even at a formal level.' 08 The most
telling contrasts are Alaska Airlines and Dames & Moore. In the former case,
the Court held that a Chadha-invalidated legislative veto of regulations gov-
erning the administration of a plan to aid airline employees dislocated by
deregulation was severable from the underlying substantive statute, because
Congress "would have enacted" the statute even without the legislative
veto. 10 9 Our Article I, Section 7 game exposes the error in this reasoning.
Once Congress becomes aware that the Article I, Section 7 game becomes a
progressive diminution in congressional power whenever Congress delegates
rulemaking to an agency it does not control (an awareness that is acute by
the 1970s), Congress becomes unwilling to delegate unless it can have some
assurance that agency policy will not wander away from the original equilib-
rium. The legislative veto was one such assurance-a clear quid pro quo for
legislative delegation to an agency Congress wants to monitor. Without the
veto, Congress would certainly want to enact a more specific statute, or no
statute at all. On the one hand, therefore, Alaska Airlines is almost certainly
106. Or, between 1981 and 1987, a Republican President and Senate and a Democratic House.
107. 488 U.S. 361 (1988).
108. See our analysis in the Introduction to this article.
109. Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 691 (1987).
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wrong in concluding that Congress would have enacted the same statutory
delegation, even if there were no legislative veto. On the other hand, because
of the obviousness of this flaw in its reasoning, Alaska Airlines is a clue as to
what Chadha itself is all about: Chadha is no rigorous formalist effort to
enforce Article I, Section 7 as written, for otherwise the Court would have
invalidated entire statutes under its traditional severability test. Instead,
Chadha is the Court's expression of concern that the legislative veto "goes
too far" in protecting Congress's interests and creates a new imbalance favor-
ing Congress's preferences.
This hypothesis is also supported by the Court's action in Dames & Moore.
The President's unilateral suspension of federal lawsuits pursuant to an exec-
utive agreement is, if anything, a more significant breach of the formal struc-
tures of lawmaking in the Constitution than the legislative veto. The
President's action added to presidential powers under IEEPA
1"0 and
amended the FSIA, II all without going through the Article I, Section 7 pro-
cedures for lawmaking. 1 2 Yet the Court did not even pause to analyze Arti-
cle I, Section 7. The reason for the Court's obliviousness is surely that the
Court found the President's action justified by the needs of the modern ad-
ministrative state. Indeed, the point of the Court's acquiescence discussion is
that there is a tradition of presidential involvement in settling foreign claims,
and that tradition is productive and workable. This suggests either that the
Court is willing to sacrifice originalist values when they are unworkable in
the modern administrative state or that the Court does not really believe in
Chadha's stringent articulation of those originalist values. We think that
both propositions are true.
B. THE ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 GAME, UPDATED FOR THE MODERN
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
The game developed in this article is, we think, superior to the Chadha
framework for analyzing Article I, Section 7 to effectuate the Framers' origi-
nal values in the modern administrative state. But, for a nonoriginalist, that
hardly makes our Article I, Section 7 game a viable one for the modern ad-
ministrative state. One key difficulty is that our game adopts several assump-
tions made by the Framers that are not easily defensible today. Specifically,
the Framers sought a balance between popular desires and policy stability
across time. The modern regulatory state seeks a balance among at least
three things: popular desires, stability, and accommodation of prior policy
110. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1988).
111. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1611 (1988).
112. The President's action, as enforced by the Court, can in the alternative be viewed as the
creation of a "treaty" enforceable as the "law of the land" under the Supremacy Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, without obtaining Senate ratification, as explicitly required by Article II.
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choices to changing circumstances and new problems. The modem regula-
tory state values stability less than the Framers did and introduces dynamic
policy evolution as part of the balance.
Moreover, the Framers envisioned a very different Congress and Presi-
dency than the institutions we now observe. For the Framers, the House of
Representatives embodied popular desires but threatened stability with its
mercurial sentiments. Bicameralism and presentment were mechanisms by
which the often volatile House could be restrained by the indirectly elected
and longer-termed (and therefore not so responsive to We the People) Senate
and President. Today, all three institutions are essentially elected by We the
People and might be said to reflect "popular" desires. Indeed, with its over-
whelming reelection percentages election after election, the House is the least
likely body to reflect popular preference changes, while the Presidency is
more likely to reflect such changes.
We are sympathetic to arguments that these changes in twentieth-century
America simply render Article I, Section 7 irrelevant to modem constitu-
tional theory, much as the Contracts Clause has been." 3 But we think that
our Article I, Section 7 game provides a heuristic method by which the origi-
nal balance can be understood and updated in light of modem developments.
The Framers' notion that lawmaking needs to balance popular desires with
stability should be updated to reflect a third value, that of dynamic policy
evolution. This third value is critical to the modem acceptance of massive
and often standardless delegation of lawmaking responsibilities to adminis-
trative agencies, which we endorse. What we urge is that the modem version
of the Article I, Section 7 game react to this delegation of lawmaking in such
a way as to preserve a balance among the three popularly elected national
institutions.
Thus, too, the Framers' specific ideas about Congress need to be reconsid-
ered. For example, their notion that the House is the seat of popular desires
needs to give way to the notion that the House, Senate, and President all
reflect popular desires, but with different constituencies: the President is the
main nationally elected official, Senators hail from the states, and House
members are elected from small, internally more homogeneous districts. The
different constituencies of the different officials justify the Article I, Section 7
game today: while in 1789 the Article I, Section 7 structure was mainly
justified by the need for the more stable institutions (Senate and President) to
rein in the House, today that structure is justified by the desirability that no
one constituency dominate lawmaking.1 4 James Madison's notion that
113. Or, indeed, as Article I, Section 7, Clause 1, the "Origination Clause," has been. Clause l's
requirement that all bills raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives is easily evaded
and virtually never enforced.
114. This insight has been supported from various pluralist political perspectives, including pub-
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"ambition must be made to counteract ambition"'1 5 is still a sound precept
for republican governance.
Consider some tentative implications of this updated Article I, Section 7
balance for constitutional doctrine:
1. The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Principle of Statutory Interpretation
Experience suggests that the needs of the modern administrative state have
overtaken the nondelegation doctrine. The key reason for extensive congres-
sional delegation is that modern regulation requires both detailed and flexible
rules that Congress cannot easily produce on a regular basis.
11 6 Agencies can
do so, and Article I, Section 7 should accommodate agency lawmaking.
Although contrary to the Framers' apparent understanding in 1789, we agree
with Mistretta 117 that the nondelegation doctrine is essentially unenforceable
as a constitutional doctrine. Its essential test, that the delegation be accom-
panied by an "intelligible principle" to which the agency must conform its
implementation, is quite elastic and has been applied creatively.
While Mistretta correctly considers the nondelegation doctrine to be a
largely toothless constitutional instrument, the opinion suggests that it may
have some teeth as a precept of statutory interpretation.'
18 We endorse and
expand upon this suggestion as one way to maintain balanced lawmaking.
Our proposed rule of statutory interpretation: when agency rules go beyond
the clear commands of the statutory text, the agency has the burden of justi-
fying its rule as one advancing the congressional intent or purpose.
This rule of responsible delegation is inconsistent with the Court's reason-
ing in Chevron and Dames & Moore, though not necessarily the Court's re-
sult in either case. We would reinterpret Chevron, not as a virtual carte
blanche for agencies to make policy judgments when Congress has broadly
delegated lawmaking to them, but as an invitation for agencies to justify pol-
icy initiatives based upon sensitivity to congressional signals and reasoned
application of the statutory policies."
9 We would reinterpret Dames &
lic choice theory. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDAN TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
THE LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY (1962).
115. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 28, at 322.
116. Congress's experience in producing detailed rules for environmental regulation has not been
promising. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR
(1981); William M. Eichbaum & Hope M. Babcock, A Question of Delegation: The Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and State-Federal Relations, 86 DICK. L. REV. 615 (1982).
117. 488 U.S. 361, 371-80 (1988).
118. Id. at 371-80 n.7 ("In recent years, our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally
has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particularly, to giving narrow
constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional.").
119. This, by the way, is the way Chevron's author, Justice Stevens, reads the decision. See INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445-48 (1987) (Stevens, J.). But see id. at 454 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (much stronger reading of Chevron).
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Moore, not as a delegation to the President by reason of Congress' inaction
and acquiescence, but as a decision that the President has at least some inher-
ent powers to settle claims under Article II of the Constitution. 20
2. Relevance of Legislative History for Statutory Interpretation
In addition to the rule of responsible delegation, we propose that judicial
review of agency action be aggressive and not deferential, that review be par-
ticularly scrutinizing when the agency is departing from established prior
rules, and that such judicial review consider legislative history as a basis for
overturning the agency's policy balance. The first two suggestions are both
contrary to the reasoning in Chevron, but are justified by the analysis in Part
II.D above: according to our Article I, Section 7 game, aggressive judicial
review of agency action is not countermajoritarian at all; by creating a new
default position, judicial review makes it more likely that congressional pref-
erences will be honored by the agency.
The third suggestion (legislative history) makes it more likely that the re-
viewing court will be enforcing the policy equilibrium reached in the Article
I, Section 7 game, or some updated version of that equilibrium. This is con-
sistent with Chevron, which examined the statute's legislative history and
found it unilluminating, but inconsistent with subsequent applications of
Chevron by the Court.
3. Congressional Influence over Agency Rulemaking
Congress already has some influence over agency rulemaking through in-
formal channels such as appropriations pressure, hearings, and the like. This
is useful, but we also endorse more formal congressional input into agency
rulemaking. The legislative veto was a promising mechanism for such input.
We agree with Chadha on its facts (no one-house vetoes of agency adjudica-
tions) but not in its implications (no legislative vetoes of any sort). Our up-
dated Article I, Section 7 game would allow-indeed encourage-two-house
vetoes of agency rulemaking, which would give Congress opportunities to
negate agency rules, after deliberation by two different bodies. We consider
the validity of one-house vetoes much less clear under modem assumptions,
and do not necessarily oppose Chadha's preclusion of them, because of the
danger that an outlying chamber will unsettle the stability and continuity of
agency policy.
120. Dames & Moore discusses briefly the President's inherent powers in this area. 453 U.S. 654,
677-78 (1981). Even under such a reinterpretation of the decision's reasoning, we think it is a
questionable decision, for it flies in the teeth of two clear federal statutes, with no sufficient justifica-
tion for the President's not seeking Senate ratification of his action as a treaty entitled to Article VI
authority.
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C. CONCLUSION: THE BAIT-AND-SWITCH GAME
Our vision of Article I, Section 7 is, we think, a realistic updating of the
Framers' original lawmaking game to the modem regulatory state where
most lawmaking is by agencies under legislative grants of authority. In this
article we have demonstrated that the Court does not have a vision of Article
I, Section 7, and that its main attempt to define a vision--Chadha-is an
unsuccessful attempt at originalist analysis because it is historically incom-
plete, ignores the impact of the regulatory state upon the Framers' vision,
and has not even been applied consistently by the Court itself.'
21
There is a final line of criticism of the Court's practice that is suggested by
our analysis. By invalidating the legislative veto and weakening judicial re-
view of agency interpretations, the Supreme Court in the 1980s was system-
atically reversing congressional expectations that were necessary parts of
dozens and perhaps hundreds of statutory deals in the last several decades.
In other words, the existence of legislative vetoes (in some statutes), the pos-
sibility of judicial review (in virtually all statutes), and the assumption that
reviewing courts would consult legislative history were necessary conditions
to Congress's willingness to enact a variety of regulatory statutes. Without
those provisions protecting against the movement of statutory policy too
much toward the President's preferences over time, Congress would not have
been willing to pass those statutes. In this way, the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Chadha, Alaska Airlines, and Chevron can be viewed as constitu-
tional "bait and switch." That is, Congress enacts legislation with certain
controls on agency lawmaking that the Court has done nothing to discour-
age, and then later on the Court changes the rules so that the statutes are left
in place but with fewer constraints for the implementing agencies.
While Congress is certainly not without means to respond to such a consti-
tutional bait and switch, these decisions represent a perhaps unconscious
preference on the part of the Supreme Court in the 1980s to shift lawmaking
power from the Congress to the President. Our analysis suggests, norma-
tively, that the Court's action was deeply inconsistent with the Constitution.
Our analysis suggests, descriptively, that the Court was itself behaving like
121. Justice Scalia has outlined a theory of Article I, Section 7 that might avoid the last pitfall.
Justice Scalia accepts the unenforceability of the nondelegation doctrine as a practical matter. "Pre-
cisely because the scope of delegation is largely uncontrollable by the courts, we must be particu-
larly rigorous in preserving the Constitution's structural restrictions that deter excessive
delegation." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Scalia would strin-
gently enforce what he sees to be the "plain meaning" of Article I, Section 7: legislative vetoes,
delegation to congressionally controlled agents, and efforts by members of Congress and committees
to influence statutory interpretation through legislative history are all invalid and unconstitutional.
Agencies must as a matter of constitutional doctrine be given full discretion to do what they want
with statutory policy, so long as they do not violate the plain meaning of the statutory language
adopted according to Article I, Section 7.
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an agent of the President in the 1980s. After all, Republicans of varying
degrees of conservatism have occupied the White House all but continuously
since 1969, and all but one Justice on the current Court have been appointed
by those Republican Presidents. Congress, in contrast, has been just as con-
tinuously dominated by liberal Democrats. In Chadha and Chevron the
Court has implemented its preference for presidential rather than congres-
sional policymaking.
This is quite rational for the Court to do. Recall Figure 4B, in which a
Court with preferences close to those of the President would permit the
agency to set policy at the veto median (x' = h), far away from the original
statutory compromise (H < x < S). Figure 4B assumed that the Court was
reviewing a single agency interpretation. Figure 4B also models the current
Court, in which the ruling is no longer an isolated review of a single agency
interpretation but is instead the systemic rules by which lower courts ap-
proach agency rulemaking. And x is no longer statutory policy, but constitu-
tional policy, which the Supreme Court of the 1980s has shifted from the
Framer's dynamics (x, with the center of lawmaking power in Congress), to
the President's dynamics (x'" with the center of lawmaking power with the
President).
In short, the game played by the Court in the 1980s was in one respect a
simple game: the President wins, at the expense of Congress. We believe
that this very feature of the Court's game is its greatest weakness, for by
contributing to the aggrandizement of presidential power the Court is con-
tributing to unbalanced governance, which was the greatest value animating
Article I, Section 7.
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